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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build 
constituencies  for  democratic  reforms  [Root  and  May  (2006)].  Consider  prisoners 
dilemma,  to  Law  and  Economics  Scholars,  the  inevitability  of  prisoner’s  dilemmas 
arising to block potentially efficient exchanges explains the need for and consequently 
the adoption of contract law. When the law enforces contracts, it permits the participants 
in  a  potential  prisoners’  dilemma  the  option  of  escaping  the  dominant  strategy 
equilibrium of non-cooperation, which prevents the achievement of efficient exchanges, 
by permitting the parties to effectively pre-commit to future cooperative behavior. Mutual 
pre-commitments  can  produce  the  efficient  cooperate-cooperate  equilibrium.  The 
existence of contract law then tends to foster efficient cooperative behaviour.  
Institutions are considered to provide the mechanisms by which individuals can 
resolve social dilemmas [Steins (1999)]. They are sets of rules that people have created in 
order to control/regulate the behavior of people using a natural resource. Several layers of 
institutions are important for institutional development and economic performance. These 
layers, from the slowest moving to the fastest moving are: human motivations and social 
institutions, political institutions, legal institutions and private institutions [Azfar (2006)]. 
Institutions perform their role to frame rules, procedure and enabling environment 
for implementation of rules. Rights of individuals are recognised and recognised through 
institutions as well. 
According to Wikipedia, Coase theorem, attributed to Ronald Coase, relates to the 
economic  efficiency  of  a  government’s  allocation  of  property  rights.  In  essence,  the 
theorem states  that in  the absence of  transaction costs,  all government allocations of 
property rights are equally efficient, because interested parties will bargain privately to 
correct  any  externality.  The  transaction  costs  and  other  inefficiencies  might  lead  to 
reduction of natural bargains, thereby lead to inefficient allocation of resources, e.g. in  
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Pakistan every lease agreement beyond one year must be registered and stamped leads to 
lessor and lessee agreeing a lease agreement of 11 months or stay unregistered [Rafay 
(2006)]. This creates hidden economy as well as leaves rights unprotected in case of a 
conflict. Enforcement mechanism is weak, for instance a person executing unregistered 
legal instrument would be charged with only Rs 500 and the instrument would not be 
canceled thereto as well [Alam (2006)], which further suggests that it does not create a 
transaction  cost  to  deter  some  bargains  at  all,  while  on  the  other  hand  mandatory 
registration requirements for any immovable property bargain is one such cost. Further 
the complexities, cumbersomeness and documentation requirements over and above those 
which are of a particular law binding create the transactional inefficiencies.  
Contradicting legal practices based  on  type of presentation  made also create a 
threat of rights violation to the bargainer as well as create the unidentified economic 
activity.  The  difference  between  definition  of  a  Sale  defined  in  Islamic  Law  differ 
slightly from the requirements of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 but in certain cases 
its more, e.g. in the case of law relating to pre-emption [Alam (2006)].   
2.  NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE LAWS 
Land being a fix supply natural resource and a fundamental factor for firm and 
household level production function requires a comprehensive short run and dynamic 
allocation mechanism. This would ensure its optimal utilisation, sustainability and adding 
value to the wellbeing of its users. In the broader perspective it encompasses factors such 
as optimality in usage, equity, sustainability and economies of scale. As this factor has 
multifaceted usage and in each of its dimensions requires a judicious use. E.g. from the 
property rights perspective it’s an individual good, from the provision of a park or a 
recreational place makes it a public good etc. From the public ownership to the private, 
directed to the undirected, tenure based provision to the forever ownership makes it a 
complex object which requires a dynamic law for its optimal usage. 
In the absence of the protection of property rights, many exchanges would not take 
place  which  are  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  welfare  models  and  thereby 
markets would remain primitive and stunted. Reliable law enforcement is an important, 
indeed  essential,  public  good  that  the  state  must  provide  to  encourage  economic 
development [Azfar (2006)]. Such a rule of law where rights and privileges of merchants 
and other citizens are clearly defined, impartially interpreted, and consistently enforced is 
important to facilitate economic activity.  
Few of the Studies focusing on Interaction of law and economics is based on the 
human relationship. Although, Economists, who regard equilibria as self-sustaining, have 
easily concluded that equilibrium conditions in relationships will be self-enforcing and 
thus  create  “rights”  among  the  relating  parties  which  exist  independently  of  any 
exogenous  legal  entitlements  and  the  law  does  not  attempt  to  intervene  in  ongoing 
relationships except to terminate them [Bowes and Bigelow (1996)]. In presence of rules 
of game such an equilibrium may easily be reached by players. But absence of rules of 
the game may affect overall efficiency of the system otherwise.  
Role  of  judicial  system is  an  important  element  in  implementation  of  laws.  It 
depends on how courts are used; it can be used to protect wealth rather than to protect 
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enforcement, loan repayment and bureaucratic discipline and still not allow citizens the 
right to assemble, mobilize and organise for political purposes [Root and May (2006)]. 
Political  institutions  consist  of  the  methods  of  selecting  the  government.  A 
growing consensus in recent years suggests that this is because in many underdeveloped 
countries, privileged elite maintain their rents by forcing suboptimal policies on the rest 
of  the  population  through  oppressive  political  institutions  [Rajan  (2006)].  Initial 
inequality in endowments and opportunities can create constituencies that support bad 
policies which reproduce those initial constituencies over time.  
New  Institutional  Economics  (NIE)  proposes  clear  property  rights  which  give 
private agents sharp incentives to minimise on costs while maintaining quality. In the 
private economic sphere, collateral laws that clearly state creditors should be paid back in 
the order in which they lent may help improve the functioning of debt markets. Further 
there exists a need for ensuring a system of law enforcement commensurate with the 
requirements of self-sustained economic growth [Haq (2006)]. 
Business surveys based on investor perceptions typically correlate judicial reforms 
as a positive step towards advancing political stability and political opening [Root and 
May (2006)]. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) talks of governance and economic 
growth. While elaborating NIE Azfar (2006) used four subject; finance and development, 
education reform, decentralisation and the delivery of foreign assistance and concluded 
that each of them can be analysed in the NIE perspective. Political institutions and social 
structure affects laws like commercial laws and their enforcement hence affecting the 
debt  and  equity  markets.  Decentralisation and  local  institutions with  reference public 
service delivery and accountability are also one of the core areas under the NIE.   
3.  INCOMPATIBILITY OF FEDERAL LAND REVENUE LAWS 
The constitution of Pakistan seeks to promote well being of the people and protect 
economic life of Pakistan by conferring fundamental rights, including economic rights 
and then protecting them by declaring laws inconsistent with them to be void [Hassan 
(2006)]. Law endows certain rights to individuals engaged in economic transactions, but 
if these entitlements
1 are not beyond those they can self-enforce, that such exogenous law 
would  be  ineffectual,  or  enforce  “Unenforceability  Hypothesis”.   The  Objectives 
resolution, now part of the constitution of 1973,  inter alia, established the guarantee  of 
accession for fundamental rights, equality of status and opportunity before law, social, 
economic and political justice [Hassan (2006)].  
Well established property rights are pre-requisite for establishment of a market 
economy. In the property rights theory the main focus is not so much on the different 
owner  positions,  but  more  on  the  conventional  fourfold  distinction  of  property  right 
regimes. Cole (2002) documents following property rights: 
State Property. Individuals have a duty to observe use/access rules determined by 
a controlling/managing agency. Agencies have a power to determine use/access rules. 
Private Property. Individuals have a privilege (reinforced with claim rights) to 
undertake socially acceptable uses, and have a duty to refrain from socially unacceptable 
uses. Others (called ‘non owners’) have a duty not to prevent socially acceptable uses, 
and have a claim that only socially acceptable uses will occur.  
1See Annexure 2 for details on bundle of rights. Shah, Shah, and Khalid   1108
 
Common  Property.  The  management  group  (the  ‘owners’)  has  a  power  to 
exclude  nonmembers,  and  nonmembers  have  a  duty  to  abide  by  such  exclusion. 
Individual members of the management group (the ‘co-owners’) have both powers and 
claims-duties with respect to the user rates and maintenance of the object owned. 
Non-property. There is no defined group of users or ‘owners’ and the benefit 
stream are available to anyone. Individuals have both a privilege and a no claim with 
respect to use rates and maintenance of the asset. The asset is an ‘open-access resource’. 
Most economists would say that resources should be regulated by assigning one of 
these property right regimes. 
Land revenue system in Pakistan has many ambiguities that land records do not 
reflect exact rights and interests of concerned parties to engage in bargains of immovable 
property, and lack of conceptual clarity. Overlapping laws creates an uncertainty and a 
setback to potential transactions of land. 
A  number  of  ambiguities  in  revenue  laws  are  related  to  its  property  rights 
mentioned under following categories: 
(1)  Khana Milkiat. 
(2)  Khana Kasht. 
(3)  Abadi Deh. 
(4)  Shamlat and different kinds of shamlat. 
(5)  Private path and public path/shara-i-aam.  
Strengthening  of  property  rights  and  the  expansion  of  competition  and 
associated  opportunities  will  help  the  very  poor  but  with  it  endowments  like 
education  development  is  necessary  [Rajan  (2006)].  Describing  the  Taxonomy  of 
land records, Khan (2006) identified that the system of land records are 5 centuries 
old, there is no single agency to coordinate titles or registration and state does not 
guarantee land titles. The formed rules are not being practiced and there is too much 
flexibility in the transfer of owner ship of land title (more than hundred). There is 
Qabza group and military interests in real estates. 
Similarly overlapping property rights due to columns of holding as section 4 of 
Land Revenue Act 1967 states; “Word ‘Holding’ meaning of vernacular equivalent 
of term ‘Holding’ is Khewat and tenants’ holding is called ‘Khatooni’ or ‘Khata’. 
Word ‘Khata’ some times is loosely applied to owner’s holding as well as tenant’s 
holding. Tenant’s holding is technically called ‘tenancy’ PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 38 
PSC 1984.  
From the analysis of old and uncorrected ownership record of 1970s revealed that 
Khawat or Khata have lost their utility due to multiple distributions. Kind of property 
reflected  through  number  Khasra  is  converted  from  rural/agriculture  into  semi-rural, 
urban and sub-urban. Mere entry in revenue record cannot be accepted as a sufficient 
proof of ownership rather the entry has to be interpreted in the light of other facts and 
circumstances of given case of CLC (1982), page 1309. Contract between proprietary 
body and non proprietary body of village are mentioned  in  CLC (1989), page 2148, 
Shariat-i-Wajibul Arz.  
The old revenue laws are insufficient to cater for current needs of ownership of 
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(1)  Size of land is same while population has increased many folds. In words 
demand has increased against constant supply (as land being a fixed supply 
resource). 
(2)  Old social system comprising close society and tribal system has evaded. The 
old social system was a check on violation of ownership rights.  
(3)  Social changes in the society have changed preferences of individuals. They 
prefer  monetary  interests  over  social  values.  Marginal  utility  of  money  is 
higher relative to marginal utility of social values. 
(4)  System governance is insufficient to strengthen property rights. A number of 
agents  are  involved  in  the  system  including  revenue,  police  officials  and 
politician. Due to heterogeneous and confusing roles and functions, it leads to 
weaken title of ownership. 
(5)  Escalating prices of land have increased value of marginal utility of land to 
individuals; therefore, they attempt to get utility of land even with insufficient 
land title. That also helped in growth of land mafia.  
(6)  Priority  of  land  owners  have  been  changing.  They  prefer  developing  and 
selling land instead of cultivating the same. 
Land mafia, take benefit of such loose situation and exploit poor and weak land 
owners. They purchase share of the poor at very low rates, after attaining possessions, in 
most of the cases legalise their possession and sell it at higher price. This situation results 
in quarrels and chain of litigation. 
The transaction costs and other inefficiencies might lead to reduction of natural 
bargains, thereby, lead to inefficient allocation of resources, e.g. in Pakistan every lease 
agreement beyond one year must be registered and stamped leads to lessor and lessee 
agreeing a lease agreement of 11 months or stay unregistered [Alam (2006)]. This creates 
hidden economy as well as leaves rights unprotected in case of a conflict. Enforcement 
mechanism is weak, for instance a person executing unregistered legal instrument would 
be charged with only Rs 500 and the instrument would not be canceled thereto as well 
[Alam (2006)], which further suggests that it does not create a transaction cost to deter 
some bargains at all, while on the other hand mandatory registration requirements for any 
immovable property bargain is one such cost. Further, the complexities, cumbersomeness 
and documentation requirements over and above those which are of a particular law, 
creates the transactional inefficiencies.  
Contradicting legal practices also create a threat of rights violation to the bargainer 
as  well  as  create  the  unidentified  economic  activity.  The  difference  between  the 
definition of a sale defined in Islamic Law differ slightly from the requirements of the 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 but in certain cases its more, e.g. in the case of law 
relating to pre-emption [Alam (2006)].  
In Pakistan, the Legal System
2  is divided into customary, Islamic, and Official 
categories, each with its distinct legal traditions, and have developed their own clients 
and niches representing yet the distinct phases of the history of the region with no change 
in their proportions [ Chaudhry (2006)]. Vast majority of people live in rural areas which 
are predominantly ruled by customary/folk Islamic laws and not the official ones.  
2See Annexure 1 for definitions of legal institutions. Shah, Shah, and Khalid   1110
 
4.  IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN 
Incompatibility  of  revenue  laws,  insufficient  implementation  mechanism  and 
misinterpretation of laws have a number of implications. Many a time legally recognised 
relationships  may  not  be  substantially  a  part  of  economic  relationships,  and  two 
categories of rights may not be co-extensive. Rules of game for determination of rights of 
individuals for marketable gains are required. Framing and implementation of rules draws 
its foundation on a governance system. For optimal governance, a legal regime must 
constitute a nested system of powers and authorities, so that it can adapt to changing 
circumstances, changes in institutional contexts and new scientific insights [Dietz, et al. 
(2003)].  
Weak Social System 
The  existence  of  informal  systems  for  deciding  conflict  (whether  economic  or 
else)  and  proportionate  influences  on  formal  as  well  as  informal  system  has  lead  to 
limited success in social engineering aspect of formal law system in Pakistan [Azam 
(2006)]. Further the official system along with Islamic and customary laws are coherent 
with  the local culture and  are influenced by personal relations,  ethnicity,  money and 
influence customs.  
Crime 
Poverty, Income inequality, unemployment, low wages, weak law enforcement both 
from the quantity and quality aspect, weak institutions could be attributed to law breaching. 
Harrison and Gfroerer (1992) found that 26.1 percent of persons booked for any violent crime, 
and  24.7  percent  of  persons  booked  for  any  property  crime  used  alcohol,  cannabis  and 
cocaine. Haq (2006) also analysed the impact of lawlessness on economic development using 
extended CGE model, and suggested that there is a two way causal relationship. 
In the present study data analysis shows that in Islamabad in a year total numbers 
of  litigations  registered  in  district  courts  are  around  12,000.  Out  of  these  litigations 
revenue  related  are  more  than  8000  in  a  year.  In  addition,  district  revenue  officers 
received more than five thousand (5000) complaints of minor nature dispute, frictions 
and anomalies based on incompatible revenue laws.   
Corruption  
Absence of clear, designated and transparent revenue laws increases complexities 
in the system. It enhances probability of using local discretion by respective official of 
government agencies. Use of discretion induces officials to seek rent in clumsy situation. 
This  rent  seeking  culture increases  in  presence of  more ambiguous  laws.  Ultimately, 
corruption in the society increases.  
“One of the biggest curses from which Sub-continent is suffering, I do not say that 
other countries are free from it, but, I think our condition is much worse, is bribery 
and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put it down with an iron hand.”  
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Corruption is defined as, “the abuse of public offices for private gains” [World 
Bank (1997)]. Corruption can affect resource allocation in two ways. First, it can change 
(mostly) private investors’ assessments of the relative merits of various investments. This 
influence follows from corruption-induced changes in the relative prices of goods and 
services,  and  of  resources  and  factors  of  production,  including  entrepreneurial  talent. 
Second, corruption can result in resource misallocation when the decisions on how public 
funds will be invested, or which private investments will be permitted, are made by a 
corrupt government agency. The misallocation follows from the possibility that a corrupt 
decision-maker  will  consider  potential  ‘corruption  payments’  as  one  of  the  decision 
criterion [Aman and Ahmad (2006)]. 
Corruption has its multiple ramifications. In his supporting argument that Pakistan 
official system is plagued with corruption,  Chaudhry (2006) notes that often it has become 
our  culture  and  routine,  pointing  out  the  moral  deterioration  of  our  society  (selling, 
teaching,  nepotism  etc.)  posing  a  question  that  ‘Is  Corruption  a  moral  deterioration, 
alteration from original,  the inability of the system to implement or a culture?’ 
The expansion of corruption in the decade of transition has coincided with a sharp, 
initial decline in output and significantly higher levels of poverty and inequality across 
the region [World Bank (2000)]. Aman and Ahmad (2006) are of the view that there is 
sufficient documentary evidence of considerable economic and social costs of corruption. 
Patwari is feeding many of his seniors on different occasions, for example hospitality of 
any VIP in the district becomes responsibility of Patwari.  
Corruption weakens public service delivery, misdirects public resources, and holds 
back the growth that is necessary to pull people out of poverty because it might be the 
poorest who is paying for it. As a result, some countries risk becoming trapped in a 
vicious circle in which pervasive corruption reduces public revenues, undermines public 
trust, and weakens the credibility of the state, unless decisive leadership can push through 
the necessary reforms. 
State Capture. It refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the 
public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and 
other  government  policies  to  their  own  advantage  as  a  result  of  the  illicit  and  non-
transparent provision of private benefits to public officials. 
While state capture encodes advantages for particular individuals or groups in the 
basic legal or regulatory framework, administrative corruption refers to the intentional 
imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and 
regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit 
and non-transparent provision of private gains to public officials. 
Azfar (2006) notes that corruption has been shown to lead to lower investment, 
slower growth, misallocated resources, poorer health and education outcomes and more 
restrictions on international trade  thereby undermining the economic development.  
Several studies have demonstrated a relationship between corruption and income 
inequality. The theoretical foundations for this relationship are derived from rent theory 
and draw on the ideas of Susan (1978) and Kruger (1974), among others. Propositions 
include: (a) Corruption may create permanent distortions from which some groups or 
individuals  can  benefit  more  than  others,  (b)  The  distributional  consequences  of 




Using  the  panel  data  of  71  developing  and  developed  countries  Aman  and 
Ahmad (2006) found that the relationship between corruption and income equality is 
considerably  negative.  A  central  message  of  corruption  and  income  inequality 
relationship  suggest  that  corruption  has  significant  distributional  implications  and, 
given  its  negative  efficiency  implications,  should  be  considered  harmful  to  both 
growth  and  equity.  Therefore,  policies  that  reduce  corruption  will  also  improve 
income distribution.  
5.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Implication of incompatible revenue laws are empirically observed and analysed. 
In this regard primary data is collected from district Islamabad. Data is described in 
Tables 1 and 2 for instance in Islamabad district only around eleven thousand cases were 
filed in civil courts during 2006. About 44 percent cases are based on incompatibility of 
land revenue laws. Ambiguity in laws leads to increase in civil litigation, thereby, cost to 
society increases.  
Table 1 
Annual Civil Cases in Islamabad  
Year  
Total Civil Nature 
Cases 




2007  6,266  3726  Not Available 
2006  10,950  4,780  5,170 
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Table 2 
Annual Criminal Cases in Islamabad District  
Year  
Total Criminal Cases 
Registered 
Land Dispute 
Based Cases   Miscellaneous Cases 
2007  4487  1086  3401 
2006  4333  1065  3268 
Source: District Courts, Islamabad.    
Around 4487 criminal cases were registered during 2007. Share of incompatible 
land revenue law based cases in total criminal cases is around one fourth. Thus these 
ambiguous and old laws directly affects crime rate in the district. 
In addition to above categories of cases individuals also register their complaints 
in revenue administration/courts pertaining to land, their property rights and disputes. On 
average 52,000 per annum petitions/complaints are filed in Islamabad with respect to 
land related issues.   
6.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is observed that incompatible revenue laws directly affect civil litigation, crime 
rate  and  transaction  cost  in  the  society.  Inconsistent  laws  increase  work  load  on  the 
governance institutions. Work load of civil and criminal courts also  increases due to 
incompatible laws. Quality of service delivery and dispensation of justice is adversely 
affected by incompatible laws. Risk averse investors normally avoid making investment 
in such as ambiguous property right regime. Transaction cost to individuals and society 
increases with ambiguous laws.     
Even though the constitution provides the development goals and law plays an 
important role in the process of development, but a legal vision and strategy compatible 
with social and economic goals with micro-legal prescription (such as customary laws 
etc.) under a macro-legal framework is needed. Imposing formal institutional structures 
on a society with incompatible traditions is unlikely to succeed in bringing about lasting 
reform. Further the judicial system will lack legitimacy until the other instruments of 
national sovereignty also win citizen acceptance. 
Economic management of today needs to develop an interdisciplinary team, of 
economists and lawyers. 
On the constitutional front the law reform could include: 
(1)  There  needs  to  be  an  economic  basis  of  laws  relating  to  economic 
transactions. 
(2)  Land revenue system including record keeping to be reformed. 
(3)  Rationalisation of fee and structure of system. 
Owing  to  significant  relationship  of  corruption  to  income  inequality,  policies 
aiming at reducing it would ultimately have a positive impact on the income inequality. A 
holistic approach with inclusion of public, private-corporate sector and civil society to 
address the issues of accountability, transparency, participation, openness and rule of law 
can help in combating such a situation. 
Thus, an effective anti-corruption strategy should:  Shah, Shah, and Khalid   1114
 
(a)  encourage  the  reduction  of  rents  by  means  of  economic  liberalisation, 
deregulation,  tax  simplification,  de-monopolisation  and  macroeconomic  stability;  (b) 
reduce discretion through administrative and civil service reform, including meritocratic 
recruitment and decentralisation; (c) honest and visible commitment by the leadership to 
the  fight  against  corruption.  The  leadership  must  show  zero  tolerance for  it;  and  (d) 
increase accountability—by building up institutions such as auditing and accountancy 
units,  through  legal  reforms  such  as  judicial  strengthening,  by  encouraging  public 
oversight through Parliament and a more vibrant civil society.  
With  secured  property  rights  openness  to  markets  and  reduced  Inequalities  in 
endowments and opportunities can play a large role in growth. There should be transition 
of land record system, backed by technical support by IFIs, such as the pilot project of 
digitisation of land use record in Rawalpindi district. Further in this regard all the sale 
deeds, land transfers and other land title changing should be through a solicitor, which 
can help in a legal and transparent manner preventing future legal recourses.  
ANNEXURE 1 
FORMS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
If legal institutions are socially taken into account as factual situations, their form 
must be such that they can actually be conceived of as particular situations. That is to say, 
as existent. There are three basis forms of particular situations: 
(1)  The existence of a certain entity.  
(2)  A certain existing entity having a certain property. 
(3)  Certain existing entities having a certain connection. 
The category of entities can be further divided in two, namely subjects, which can 
perform acts, and objects, which can be acted upon. With the aid of both distinctions, a 
classification  of  particular  situations  and  therefore  also  of  legal  institutions  can  be 
constructed. The idea is that this classification is exhaustive, because there are subjects 
and objects, which can only have a limited number of relations [Wessel (2001)]. 
The different kinds of legal institutions can be characterised as follows [Ruiter 
(1997, 2001, 2004)]: 
Legal Persons: A legal person is a valid legal regime with the form of an entity 
that can act. Example: the European Community. 
Legal Objects: A legal object is a valid legal regime with the form of an entity 
that can serve as the object of transactions. Example: a conveyable right of ownership. 
Legal  Qualities:  A  legal  quality  is  a  valid  legal  regime  with  the  form  of  a 
characteristic of a subject. The legal regime regulates the behavioral relation between that 
particular subject and all other subjects. Example: a person’s legal majority. 
Legal Status: A legal status is a valid legal regime with the form of a characteristic of 
an object. The legal regime regulates the behavioral relations between particular subjects 
responsible for that object and all others subjects. Example: a listed historical monument. 
Legal Connections: A personal legal connection is a valid legal regime with the 
form  of  a  connection  between  subjects.  The  legal  regime  regulates  the  behavioral 
relations between those particular subjects. Example: a personal right. Incompatibility of Laws and Natural Resources   1115
 
Legal Configurations: A legal configuration is a valid legal regime with the form 
of  a  connection  between  objects.  The  legal  regime  regulates  the  behavioral  relations 
between particular subjects with certain relations towards each of the objects. Example: 
an easement, that is, a legal regime with the form of a connection between a servient 
tenement and a dominant tenement consisting in a burden (e.g. a right of way) laid on the 
former for the benefit of the latter. All successive owners of the servient tenement are 
obligated to bear the burden and all successive owners of the dominant tenement are 
entitled to treat the former as thus obligated.  
ANNEXURE 2 
BUNDLE OF RIGHTS 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) describe five different property rights: 
(1)  Access, the right to enter a defined physical property. 
(2)  Withdrawal, the right to obtain the ‘products’ of a resource (e.g., catch fish, 
appropriate water, etc.). 
(3)  Management, the right to regulate internal use patterns and to transform a 
resource by making improvements. 
(4)  Exclusion, the right to determine who will have an access right, and how that 
right may be transferred. 
(5)  Alienation, the right to sell or lease either or both of the above-mentioned 
collective-choice rights   
Bundles of Rights Associated with Types of Owners 
 
 




Authorised           
Entrant 
Access  x  X  x  X  X 
Withdrawal  x  X  x  X  
Management  x  X  x   
Exclusion  x  X    
Alienation  x     
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